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Titolo:
A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning
Autore:
Garoupa, NR; Gata, JE;
Indirizzi:
Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Empresa, E-08005 Barcelona, Spain Univ Pompeu Fabra Barcelona Spain E-08005 resa, E-08005 Barcelona, Spain Inst Super Gestao, P-1750306 Lisbon, Portugal Inst Super Gestao Lisbon Portugal P-1750306 , P-1750306 Lisbon, Portugal
Titolo Testata:
PUBLIC CHOICE
fascicolo: 1-2, volume: 110, anno: 2002,
pagine: 41 - 65
SICI:
0048-5829(200201)110:1-2<41:ATOICM>2.0.ZU;2-2
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; PRESSURE GROUPS; COOPERATION; PROPERTY; SUCCESS; MODEL; WAR;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
48
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Garoupa, NR Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Empresa, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, E-08005 Barcelona, Spain Univ Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 Barcelona Spain E-08005
Citazione:
N.R. Garoupa e J.E. Gata, "A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning", PUBL CHOICE, 110(1-2), 2002, pp. 41-65

Abstract

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitutean equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions,where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem mightnot be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 01/04/20 alle ore 11:43:55