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Titolo:
Corporation tax asymmetries and cartel unity
Autore:
Gendron, PP;
Indirizzi:
KPMG Meijburg & Co, Global Transfer Pricing Serv, Amsterdam, Netherlands KPMG Meijburg & Co Amsterdam Netherlands g Serv, Amsterdam, Netherlands Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, Int Tax Program, Toronto, ON, Canada Univ Toronto Toronto ON Canada ent, Int Tax Program, Toronto, ON, Canada
Titolo Testata:
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE
fascicolo: 5-6, volume: 8, anno: 2001,
pagine: 659 - 674
SICI:
0927-5940(2001)8:5-6<659:CTAACU>2.0.ZU;2-B
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
REPEATED GAMES; IMPERFECT;
Keywords:
tax asymmetries; collusive equilibrium; losses; punishment;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
12
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Gendron, PP POB 74600, NL-1070 DE Amsterdam, Netherlands POB 74600 Amsterdam Netherlands NL-1070 DE rdam, Netherlands
Citazione:
P.P. Gendron, "Corporation tax asymmetries and cartel unity", INT TAX P F, 8(5-6), 2001, pp. 659-674

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of changing the extent to which tax losses are refunded to firms in a model of imperfect competition. It proposes a particular collusive equilibrium in a repeated oligopoly with homogeneous quantity-setting firms. The industry sustains tacit collusion by using credible and severe punishments of deviations. The analysis of the most collusive equilibrium with losses indicates that a tax policy which increases refundsreduces output, increases market price, and therefore strengthens tacit collusion. In addition, the policy increases government revenue. An increase in the corporation tax rate has similar effects.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 18/01/20 alle ore 21:31:38