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Titolo:
Project-specific external financing and headquarters monitoring incentives
Autore:
Laux, C;
Indirizzi:
Univ Mannheim, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany Univ Mannheim Mannheim Germany1 iv Mannheim, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany
Titolo Testata:
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION
fascicolo: 2, volume: 17, anno: 2001,
pagine: 397 - 412
SICI:
8756-6222(200110)17:2<397:PEFAHM>2.0.ZU;2-V
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
CAPITAL STRUCTURE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; SHORT-TERM; DEBT; INVESTMENT; INVESTORS; CONTRACTS; COSTS; FIRM;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
--discip_BC--
Citazioni:
23
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Laux, C Univ Mannheim, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany Univ Mannheim MannheimGermany 1 eim, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany
Citazione:
C. Laux, "Project-specific external financing and headquarters monitoring incentives", J LAW EC OR, 17(2), 2001, pp. 397-412

Abstract

This article analyzes the relationship between a firm's financing and its project incorporation decisions, It is shown that headquarters may have an incentive to carry out a new project within a subsidiary rather than withinthe existing firm. The project is partially financed through an external claim which is taken on by the subsidiary even though the parent corporationhas sufficient funds to finance the project on its own. The reason for this is that reducing headquarters' claim on the project's cash flow may increase its incentive to monitor the quality of the project prior to making a continuation investment. This has positive incentive implications for the manager who is running the project.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 04/04/20 alle ore 02:51:06