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Titolo:
The evolution of norms
Autore:
Bendor, J; Swistak, P;
Indirizzi:
Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA Stanford Univ Stanford CA USA 94305 Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA Univ Maryland, Dept Govt & Polit, College Pk, MD 20742 USA Univ Maryland College Pk MD USA 20742 t & Polit, College Pk, MD 20742 USA Univ Maryland, Dept Math, Program Appl & Computat Math, College Pk, MD 20742 USA Univ Maryland College Pk MD USA 20742 utat Math, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
Titolo Testata:
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
fascicolo: 6, volume: 106, anno: 2001,
pagine: 1493 - 1545
SICI:
0002-9602(200105)106:6<1493:TEON>2.0.ZU;2-J
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME; RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; TIT-FOR-TAT; STOCHASTIC STRATEGIES; COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOCIAL-CONTROL; COOPERATION; STABILITY; RECIPROCITY; EFFICIENCY;
Tipo documento:
Review
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
117
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Bendor, J Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, 518 Mem Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA Stanford Univ 518 Mem Way Stanford CA USA 94305 rd, CA 94305 USA
Citazione:
J. Bendor e P. Swistak, "The evolution of norms", AM J SOCIOL, 106(6), 2001, pp. 1493-1545

Abstract

Social norms that induce us to reward or punish people not for what they did to us but for what they did to other members of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociological and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. This article shows how social norms can be deductively derived from principles of (boundedly) rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of evolutionary games.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 30/03/20 alle ore 19:58:15