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Titolo:
Finite horizons, political economy, and growth
Autore:
Kahn, JA; Lim, JS;
Indirizzi:
Fed Reserve Bank New York, Res Dept, New York, NY 10045 USA Fed Reserve Bank New York New York NY USA 10045 t, New York, NY 10045 USA Kwangwoon Univ, Dept Int Trade, Nowon Ku, Seoul 139701, South Korea Kwangwoon Univ Seoul South Korea 139701 on Ku, Seoul 139701, South Korea
Titolo Testata:
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
fascicolo: 1, volume: 4, anno: 2001,
pagine: 1 - 25
SICI:
1094-2025(200101)4:1<1:FHPEAG>2.0.ZU;2-V
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
TIME-CONSISTENCY; EDUCATION; DEFICIT; POLICY;
Keywords:
growth; political instability; political economy; education; Markov equilibrium;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
24
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Kahn, JA Fed Reserve Bank New York, Res Dept, 33 Liberty St, New York, NY 10045 USA Fed Reserve Bank New York 33 Liberty St New York NY USA 10045 USA
Citazione:
J.A. Kahn e J.S. Lim, "Finite horizons, political economy, and growth", REV ECON DY, 4(1), 2001, pp. 1-25

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy of growth when agents and the government have finite horizons and equilibrium growth is inefficient. A "representative" government (i.e., one whose preferences reflect those of its constituents) endowed merely with the ability to tax and transfer can improve somewhat on the market allocation, but cannot achieve first-best growth. Efficiency requires in addition the ability to bind future governments. We argue that this ability is related to political stability, and we provide empirical evidence that stability and growth-related policies (namely education) are meaningfully related. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 22/01/20 alle ore 06:52:25