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Titolo:
Preference evolution, two-speed dynamics, and rapid social change
Autore:
Sandholm, WH;
Indirizzi:
Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA Univ Wisconsin Madison WI USA 53706 sin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
Titolo Testata:
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
fascicolo: 3, volume: 4, anno: 2001,
pagine: 637 - 679
SICI:
1094-2025(200107)4:3<637:PETDAR>2.0.ZU;2-4
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
RISK; REVOLUTION; ATTITUDES; GAMES;
Keywords:
evolutionary game theory; evolution of preferences; coordination games;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
20
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Sandholm, WH Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, 1180 Observ Dr, Madison, WI 53706 USA Univ Wisconsin 1180 Observ Dr Madison WI USA 53706 53706 USA
Citazione:
W.H. Sandholm, "Preference evolution, two-speed dynamics, and rapid social change", REV ECON DY, 4(3), 2001, pp. 637-679

Abstract

We present a dynamic analysis of the evolution of preferences in a strategic environment. In our model, each player's behavior depends on both the game's payoffs and his idiosyncratic biases, but only the game's payoffs determine his evolutionary success. Dynamics run at two speeds at once; while natural selection slowly reshapes the distribution of preferences, players quickly learn to behave as their preferences dictate. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the paired trajectories of society's preferences andbehavior. While aggregate behavior adjusts smoothly in equilibration games, in coordination games aggregate behavior can jump discretely in an instant of evolutionary time. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

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Documento generato il 26/01/20 alle ore 22:16:28