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Titolo:
Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction

Autore:

Indirizzi:: Univ Groningen, Fac Law, NL-9700 AB Groningen, Netherlands Univ GroningenGroningen Netherlands NL-9700 AB B Groningen, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Inst Environm Econ, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany Interdisciplinary Inst Environm Econ Heidelberg Germany D-69115 Germany Univ Groningen, Fac econ, Dept Microecon, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands Univ Groningen Groningen Netherlands NL-9700 AV V Groningen, Netherlands
Titolo Testata:: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
fascicolo: 3, volume: 41, anno: 2001,
pagine: 286 - 294
SICI:: 0095-0696(200105)41:3<286:SHIAEE>2.0.ZU;2-A
Fonte:: ISI
Lingua:: ENG
Keywords:: EPA auctions;
Tipo documento:: Article
Natura:: Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:: Social & Behavioral Sciences; --discip_BC--
Citazioni:: 15
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:: Indirizzo: Dijkstra, BR Univ Groningen, Fac Law, NL-9700 AB Groningen, Netherlands Univ Groningen Groningen Netherlands NL-9700 AB Netherlands



Citazione:: B.R. Dijkstra e M. Haan, "Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction", J ENVIR EC, 41(3), 2001, pp. 286-294

Abstract

Cason (1993, J. Environ. Econom, Management 25, 177-195, doi:10.1006/jeem 1993.1041) argued that the auction which the EPA used in order to start tile market for sulfur allowances may reduce the efficiency of the market since it gives sellers an incentive to understate their valuation. In this paper we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested when we take into account that sellers can also submit a bid. We show that sellers have an incentive to set their asking price equal to 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. (C) 2000 Academic Press.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 16/01/21 alle ore 15:39:19