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Titolo:
Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy
Autore:
Jelovac, Z;
Indirizzi:
Univ Vigo, Dept Fundamento Anal Econ, Fac CC EE & EE, Vigo 36200, Spain Univ Vigo Vigo Spain 36200 Anal Econ, Fac CC EE & EE, Vigo 36200, Spain
Titolo Testata:
HEALTH ECONOMICS
fascicolo: 1, volume: 10, anno: 2001,
pagine: 9 - 25
SICI:
1057-9230(200101)10:1<9:PPCTDA>2.0.ZU;2-X
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
HEALTH-SERVICES; DEMAND;
Keywords:
health; incentive contracts; moral hazard; physician;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Clinical Medicine
Citazioni:
9
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Jelovac, Z Univ Vigo, Dept Fundamento Anal Econ, Fac CC EE & EE, Lagoas Marcosende S-N, Vigo 36200, Spain Univ Vigo Lagoas Marcosende S-N Vigo Spain36200 36200, Spain
Citazione:
Z. Jelovac, "Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy", HEALTH ECON, 10(1), 2001, pp. 9-25

Abstract

We derive optimal payment contracts for physicians when neither physicians' effort to gather information about the patient's health condition (diagnosis effort) nor the actual patient's health condition (physicians' private information) are contractible. In a model where the patient is allowed to demand health care on more than one occasion, we show that, in general, the optimal payment contract includes supply-side cost sharing. This provides the physician with incentives to provide the most adequate treatment and to gather an informative signal about the patient's illness, to decrease the likelihood of future cost sharing. However, for some extreme values of the parameters of the model, we show that a public insurer may prefer to induce some 'blind' decision making. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Documento generato il 19/01/20 alle ore 11:39:32