Catalogo Articoli (Spogli Riviste)

OPAC HELP

Titolo:
Corporate reorganizations and non-cash auctions
Autore:
Rhodes-Kropf, M; Viswanathan, S;
Indirizzi:
Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA Columbia Univ New York NY USA 10027 Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27706 USA Duke Univ Durham NC USA 27706 v, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27706 USA
Titolo Testata:
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
fascicolo: 4, volume: 55, anno: 2000,
pagine: 1807 - 1849
SICI:
0022-1082(200008)55:4<1807:CRANA>2.0.ZU;2-6
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
BANKRUPTCY; CHAPTER-11; CONTRACTS; DESIGN; FIRMS;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
--discip_BC--
Citazioni:
40
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Rhodes-Kropf, M Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA Columbia Univ New York NY USA 10027 ew York, NY 10027 USA
Citazione:
M. Rhodes-Kropf e S. Viswanathan, "Corporate reorganizations and non-cash auctions", J FINANCE, 55(4), 2000, pp. 1807-1849

Abstract

This paper extends the theory of non-cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggests using non-cash auctions to increase cash-constrained bidder participation. We examine this proposal and demonstrate that securities may lead to higher revenue. However, bidders pool unless bids include debt, which results in possible repossession by the seller. This suggestsall-equity outcomes are unlikely and explains the high debt of reorganizedfirms. Securities also inefficiently determine bidders' incentive contracts and the firm's capital structure. Therefore, we recommend a new cash auction for an incentive contract.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 04/04/20 alle ore 08:42:19