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Titolo:
Trade disclosure regulation in markets with negotiated trades
Autore:
Naik, NY; Neuberger, A; Viswanathan, S;
Indirizzi:
Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA Duke Univ Durham NC USA 27708 v, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England London Business Sch London England NW1 4SA Sch, London NW1 4SA, England
Titolo Testata:
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
fascicolo: 4, volume: 12, anno: 1999,
pagine: 873 - 900
SICI:
0893-9454(1999)12:4<873:TDRIMW>2.0.ZU;2-8
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
STOCK-EXCHANGE; LIQUIDITY; INFORMATION; TRANSPARENCY; EQUILIBRIUM; UPSTAIRS;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
--discip_BC--
Citazioni:
30
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Viswanathan, S Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA Duke Univ Durham NC USA 27708 siness, Durham, NC 27708 USA
Citazione:
N.Y. Naik et al., "Trade disclosure regulation in markets with negotiated trades", REV FINANC, 12(4), 1999, pp. 873-900

Abstract

In dealership markets disclosure of size and price details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure ofpublic-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyze a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a public trade and then offsets her position by trading with other market makers. We distinguish between quantity risk and price revision risk. We show that if the the market maker learns some information about the motive behind public trade, neither regime is unambiguously welfare superior. This is because greater transparency improves quantity risk sharing but worsens price revision risk sharing.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 28/03/20 alle ore 23:04:13