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Titolo:
Automobile insurance contracts and risk of accident: An empirical test using French individual data
Autore:
Richaudeau, D;
Indirizzi:
Univ Paris 01, Lab Microecon Appl, Dept Evaluat & Rech Accidentol, INRETS,F-75231 Paris 05, France Univ Paris 01 Paris France 05 ccidentol, INRETS,F-75231 Paris 05, France Ctr Rech Econ & Stat Timbre, Lab Finance Assurance, F-92245 Malakoff, France Ctr Rech Econ & Stat Timbre Malakoff France F-92245 245 Malakoff, France
Titolo Testata:
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE THEORY
fascicolo: 1, volume: 24, anno: 1999,
pagine: 97 - 114
SICI:
0926-4957(199906)24:1<97:AICARO>2.0.ZU;2-8
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD METHODS; ADVERSE SELECTION; MORAL HAZARD; MODELS;
Keywords:
adverse selection; moral hazard; automobile insurance contracts; risk of accident; econometrics;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
--discip_BC--
Citazioni:
17
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Richaudeau, D Univ Paris 01, Lab Microecon Appl, Dept Evaluat & Rech Accidentol, INRETS,F-75231 Paris 05, France Univ Paris 01 Paris France 05 ETS,F-75231 Paris 05, France
Citazione:
D. Richaudeau, "Automobile insurance contracts and risk of accident: An empirical test using French individual data", GENEVA PAP, 24(1), 1999, pp. 97-114

Abstract

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability ofaccident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 14/08/20 alle ore 08:15:13