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Titolo:
Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
Autore:
Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM; Segal, U;
Indirizzi:
Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA Univ Calif Davis Davis CA USA 95616 Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA Univ Calif Los Angeles Los Angeles CA USA 90095 Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA Univ Western Ontario, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada Univ Western Ontario London ON Canada N6A 5C2 London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
Titolo Testata:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
fascicolo: 2, volume: 85, anno: 1999,
pagine: 169 - 225
SICI:
0022-0531(199904)85:2<169:EICEAP>2.0.ZU;2-X
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISMS; ALLOCATION MECHANISMS; EXCHANGE ECONOMIES; STRATEGY;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social & Behavioral Sciences
Citazioni:
26
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Makowski, L Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA Univ Calif Davis Davis CA USA 95616 Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
Citazione:
L. Makowski et al., "Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive", J ECON THEO, 85(2), 1999, pp. 169-225

Abstract

Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive, i.e., each individual isunable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. Equivalently, in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type. The characterization applies whether preferences are ordinalor quasilinear, and it also applies to continuum economies. Perfectly competitive mechanisms are non-generic (although non-vacuous) in finite economies and are generic (but non-universal) in continuum economies. We use theseresults to provide bridges to related work. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D51, D62. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 05/12/20 alle ore 10:17:42