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Titolo:
Conspiratorial whispers and conspicuous displays: Games of signal detection
Autore:
Johnstone, RA;
Indirizzi:
Univ Cambridge, Dept Zool, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, England Univ Cambridge Cambridge England CB2 3EJ ool, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, England
Titolo Testata:
EVOLUTION
fascicolo: 6, volume: 52, anno: 1998,
pagine: 1554 - 1563
SICI:
0014-3820(199812)52:6<1554:CWACDG>2.0.ZU;2-0
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
PHILIP SIDNEY GAME; SEXUAL SELECTION; PIED FLYCATCHERS; MATE SELECTION; EVOLUTION; PREDATION; MODEL; COMMUNICATION; HANDICAP; DESIGN;
Keywords:
cooperative communication; game theory; handicap principle; honest signaling; signal detection theory;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Agriculture,Biology & Environmental Sciences
Life Sciences
Citazioni:
43
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Indirizzo: Johnstone, RA Univ Cambridge, Dept Zool, Downing St, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, England Univ Cambridge Downing St Cambridge England CB2 3EJ England
Citazione:
R.A. Johnstone, "Conspiratorial whispers and conspicuous displays: Games of signal detection", EVOLUTION, 52(6), 1998, pp. 1554-1563

Abstract

Recent models of signaling have assumed that the expenditure required to ensure detection of a display is negligible and have concentrated instead onthe costs that may be necessary to maintain honesty. Such models predict that individuals who share the same interests are likely to communicate using "conspiratorial whispers," signals that are cheap and inconspicuous. Here, I present a game-theoretical model of signal detection (in a noisy environment, in the presence of potential eavesdroppers), which demonstrates thatthe idea of conspiratorial whispers is far too simplistic. It is true thatin "cooperative" signaling systems (where signalers attempt to elicit responses that are beneficial for receivers), signal cost is not required to maintain honesty. However, some level of expenditure is still needed to ensure that a signal is reliably detected. Moreover, there exists a conflict of interest between signalers and receivers over the division of this expenditure. To predict the stable level of display in such cases, one needs to know how this conflict of interest will be resolved. The model reveals that the outcome may range from a whisper to a conspicuous and costly (though still conspiratorial) display. The more closely related the receiver is to the signaler, the greater the level of signal exaggeration that is expected-theopposite prediction to that of honest signaling models.

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Documento generato il 07/07/20 alle ore 19:06:56