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Titolo:
IMPLEMENTATION OF COLLEGE ADMISSION RULES
Autore:
KARA T; SONMEZ T;
Indirizzi:
UNIV ROCHESTER,DEPT ECON ROCHESTER NY 14627 UNIV MICHIGAN,DEPT ECON ANN ARBOR MI 48109
Titolo Testata:
Economic theory
fascicolo: 2, volume: 9, anno: 1997,
pagine: 197 - 218
SICI:
0938-2259(1997)9:2<197:IOCAR>2.0.ZU;2-E
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS; NASH IMPLEMENTATION; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS; RESIDENTS;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Physical, Chemical & Earth Sciences
Citazioni:
29
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Citazione:
T. Kara e T. Sonmez, "IMPLEMENTATION OF COLLEGE ADMISSION RULES", Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 197-218

Abstract

We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rulesare supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the ''lower bound'' stable rule is implementable in both senses. The ''upper bound'' Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.

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Documento generato il 29/11/20 alle ore 16:27:45