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Titolo:
POLICY INCONSISTENCY AND EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE
Autore:
DOOLEY MP; SVENSSON LEO;
Indirizzi:
UNIV CALIF SANTA CRUZ SANTA CRUZ CA 95064 UNIV STOCKHOLM,INST INT ECON STUDIES S-10691 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN
Titolo Testata:
Journal of international money and finance
fascicolo: 3, volume: 13, anno: 1994,
pagine: 364 - 374
SICI:
0261-5606(1994)13:3<364:PIAEDS>2.0.ZU;2-8
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
OVERHANG; RELIEF;
Tipo documento:
Article
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Social Sciences Citation Index
Citazioni:
30
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Citazione:
M.P. Dooley e L.E.O. Svensson, "POLICY INCONSISTENCY AND EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE", Journal of international money and finance, 13(3), 1994, pp. 364-374

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt-service payments reflects, in part, their inability to credibly and permanently default. The benefits of a credible default would include increased private investment. But this would, in turn, tend to create conditions in which it would then be optimal for the government to resume payments. Thus, debt remains a threat even after the announcement of repudiation. It follows that the expected benefits of such an action are limited and may be offset by penalties imposed by creditors.

ASDD Area Sistemi Dipartimentali e Documentali, Università di Bologna, Catalogo delle riviste ed altri periodici
Documento generato il 21/09/20 alle ore 03:24:21