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Titolo:
BAYESIAN AND WEAKLY ROBUST FIRST BEST MECHANISMS - CHARACTERIZATIONS
Autore:
MAKOWSKI L; MEZZETTI C;
Indirizzi:
UNIV CALIF DAVIS,DEPT ECON DAVIS CA 95616 UNIV N CAROLINA,DEPT ECON CHAPEL HILL NC 27599
Titolo Testata:
Journal of economic theory
fascicolo: 2, volume: 64, anno: 1994,
pagine: 500 - 519
SICI:
0022-0531(1994)64:2<500:BAWRFB>2.0.ZU;2-L
Fonte:
ISI
Lingua:
ENG
Soggetto:
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; EFFICIENT MECHANISMS; TRADING MECHANISMS; IMPLEMENTATION; PREFERENCES; REVELATION; RULES;
Tipo documento:
Note
Natura:
Periodico
Settore Disciplinare:
Physical, Chemical & Earth Sciences
Citazioni:
22
Recensione:
Indirizzi per estratti:
Citazione:
L. Makowski e C. Mezzetti, "BAYESIAN AND WEAKLY ROBUST FIRST BEST MECHANISMS - CHARACTERIZATIONS", Journal of economic theory, 64(2), 1994, pp. 500-519

Abstract

We investigate the possibility of designing efficient mechanisms thatare consistent with voluntary participation. We present two main results. First, we characterize the class of Bayesian mechanisms that are ex post efficient, interim individually rational, and ex post budget balancing. Second, we characterize the class of dominant strategy mechanisms that are ex post efficient and ex post individually rational, but only ex ante budget balancing. Both our characterizations have simple and intuitive interpretations. The designer can implement a first best outcome if and only if the sum of the non-distortionary charges shecan impose on agents covers the deficit created by giving each agent the total gains from trade. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

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Documento generato il 05/12/20 alle ore 10:33:55